John Locke :: Empiricists, Empiricism

John Locke's, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), was first criticized by the philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton, in his "Cursory Reflections upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and appended to his Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690). Norris's criticisms of Locke prompted three replies, which were only posthumously published. Locke has been viewed, historically, as the winner of this debate; however, new evidence has emerged which suggests that Norris's argument against the foundation of knowledge in sense-perception that the Essay advocated was a valid and worthy critique, which Locke did, in fact, take rather seriously. Charlotte Johnston's "Locke's Examination of Malebranche and John Norris" (1958), has been widely accepted as conclusively showing that Locke's replies were not philosophical, but rather personal in origin; her essay, however, overlooks critical facts that undermin e her subjective analysis of Locke's stance in relation to Norris's criticisms of the Essay. This paper provides those facts, revealing the philosophical—not personal—impetus for Locke's replies. INTRODUCTION "Locke's Examination of Malebranche and John Norris" (1958), by Charlotte Johnston,1 connects John Locke's posthumously published treatise on the philosophy of Nicolas Malebranche to the replies he had written to an English philosopher and theologian, John Norris of Bemerton. When Locke first published An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690),2 Norris, aided by the philosophy of Malebranche, responded with the first critique of the Essay, entitled "Cursory Reflections upon a Book call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding," and appended to Norris's Christian Blessedness or Discourses upon the Beatitudes (1690).3 Three texts: "JL to Mr. Norris" (1692), An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God (1693),4 and Some Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norris's Books, wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of our Seeing all Things in God (1693),5 according to Johnston, were all a direct response to Norris. Johnston's essay, which has been widely accepted, clearly shows the interrelatedness of the texts; however, her appraisal of them as a response to Norris, incorrectly devalues their philosophical seriousness by overestimating the importance of a personal quarrel between Norris and Locke. She concludes her essay with this summation: "the stimulus for these three papers came directly from Norris, from his criticisms of the newly published Essay, and still more from his personal relationship with Locke"; otherwise, "Locke's opposition to the theory of vision in God would surely have remained unexpressed, since he felt the notion to be sufficiently absurd to die of its own accord.